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Abstract 
 
Today's complex systems require understanding beyond one person’s capability to 
comprehend. Each system requires a team to divide the system into understandable sub-
systems which can then be analyzed with an Integrated Hazard Analysis. The team must 
have both specific experiences and diversity of experience.  Safety experience and system 
understanding are not always manifested in one individual.  Group dynamics make the 
difference between success and failure as well as the difference between a difficult task 
and a rewarding experience.  There are examples in the news which demonstrate the need 
to connect the pieces of a system into a complete picture.  The Columbia disaster is now a 
standard example of a low consequence hazard in one part of the system; the External 
Tank is a catastrophic hazard cause for a companion subsystem, the Space Shuttle 
Orbiter.  The interaction between the hardware, the manufacturing process, the handling, 
and the operations contributed to the problem.  Each of these had analysis performed, but 
who constituted the team which integrated this analysis together?  This paper will explore 
some of the methods used for dividing up a complex system; and how one integration 
team has analyzed the parts.  How this analysis has been documented in one particular 
launch space vehicle case will also be discussed. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper draws on examples from National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) programs and is applicable to forming teams in other industries.  
 
The safety team discussed in this paper describes the team that the safety organization is 
responsibile for. It is recognized that the complete safety effort includes the design 
engineers and systems engineers that work diligently with safety to analyze the system.  
While working on a payload for the European Space Agency (ESA), the chief engineer 
was my greatest ally on the project and provided me a much greater understanding of 
electrical safety.  Building this bond can be as important as organizing the safety 
engineers that make up the team discussed in this paper. 
 
After the accident it is generally easier to see the integrated failure mechanism.  Finding 
the interaction before hand is difficult.  A number of cases are presented in the book 
“Normal Accidents,” by Charles Perrow (Ref. 1), where many of today’s high risk 
technologies are discussed.  There are times when engineers have identified the 
integrated hazard, but the hazard is not considered realistic by management.  This was 
evident in the Challenger accident where part of the engineering team was concerned 
with the conditions of the Solid Rocket Booster O-ring before the flight (Ref. 2), and the 
Columbia accident where some were concerned enough with the foam loss to investigate 
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means of determining if damage had occurred (Ref. 3).  Having a well-respected team is 
important as well as being positively coupled with the engineering team.  
 
 Integrated Safety Analysis Team Disciplines 
 
Complex systems involve electrical systems, mechanical systems, fluids, software, and 
human systems (operations).  Each system must be understood individually, as well as its 
part in the system as a whole.  One difficulty is finding safety engineers to fill the team 
ranks who have backgrounds in each of these areas.  This difficulty is due to a number of 
reasons.  One reason is engineering graduates generally desire to perform design work.  A 
second reason is that the increase in the number of large government projects has 
diminished the available pool of safety engineers.  Another reason is that in the past the 
need for a separate safety discipline was not well understood nor supported by the 
engineering community and academia.  This means the safety discipline path was not 
available for engineers to pursue.  This fact affects the constituency of the team.  Where 
one might ideally prefer an even mix of disciplines, reality dictates that this is not 
possible.  This leads to choosing flexible people who have an eager desire to learn and an 
interest in the product.  This also requires that a mentoring situation be provided as well 
as an open team arrangement where discovering the hazards is a joint experience.  
Although most of the engineers on the design side of the projects are eager to teach and 
explain, they are often inundated with work and do not have the time to go into basics.  In 
addition, the safety team is supposed to contribute to the design which is difficult with 
out basic experience in that field.  With the shortage of safety engineers, the team will 
have to be populated with a large number of either non-safety experienced discipline 
engineers, or safety engineers without discipline experience.  This requires that the team 
have a mix of experienced safety engineers, discipline engineers, a willingness to share 
the workload, and a spirit of camaraderie.   
 
Integrated Safety Analysis Process 
 
In order to understand how safety analysis is divided, one must understand how a 
Program is broken down.  NASA typically organizes safety in terms of a Program; for 
example, the Space Shuttle Program, the Apollo Program, and the Constellation Program.  
The Programs are considered Level II.  Each Program consists of projects; for example, 
within the Constellation Program, there is the Ares project (the launch vehicle), and the 
Orion project (the crewed portion).  These projects are considered Level III. There are 
other projects as well in the Constellation Program.  The Ares project is also divided 
organizationally into three elements: Upper Stage, Upper Stage Engine, and First Stage 
(Fig. 1).  Level I is Headquarters (HQ) where the top level NASA requirements are kept. 
 
In the past NASA has taken two basic approaches to the Shuttle and Payload/Station 
safety process.  Each approach organized differently to respond to the requirements, but 
each having a separate safety organization working in conjunction with the design team. 
The Shuttle approach is a System Based approach added by engineering after the 
Columbia accident. The Payload/Station approach is chaired by program integration with 
discipline membership (engineering, safety, and operations).  The Constellation project 
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uses a safety panel, the Constellation Safety Engineering Review Panel (CSERP). 
CSERP originally reported to program management, but is now under the auspices of 
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance.  The safety team presents the hazard analysis 
to the CSERP in phased reviews which are in proximity to the project milestone reviews. 
This ensures the support and participation   engineering. engineering.engineering. At each 
level there are multiple independent lines of communication to NASA upper management 
(e.g., Center Directors, HQ S&MA Director) by various means of Chief Safety Officers 
and the Directors of the safety organizations.  
 
Each of these processes has a commonality in that they require hazard reports to be 
generated.  A hazard report contains a top level hazard, the list of causes for that hazard, a 
list of controls for each cause, verification for each control, and other supporting data; 
such as, pertinent portions of fault trees, retention rationale, references to the Failure 
Modes and Effect Analysis/Critical Item List, and indication of risk. These reports, when 
taken together, should reflect the entire set of hazards to the vehicle. The analysis process 
is not only to document the controls that are in place, but also to help drive the design by 
discovering hazards that are not controlled and by providing feedback to the design 
organization. This process also provides management information on how much risk they 
are accepting and where the areas of open work are.  
 
Integrated Safety Team Responsibilities 
 
One consideration in delineation of responsibility is division of labor between the parts of 
the task.  For Ares, the team has a division of labor. There is a lead/facilitator, one 
graphical analyst that is responsible for leading the fault tree effort, several design 
interface/analysts, a report champion, and an engineering interface.  Although each of the 
team members must have these skills, at least one member must excel in each of these 
tasks.  Knowing what is needed and where the short fall is will help to shore up any weak 
areas. 
 
The lead/facilitator is generally one person, but sometimes the facilitator role is passed to 
another while other aspects of the safety organization are considered; such as, changes to 
requirements, special studies, Level II schedule, and management.  For the Ares program, 
the lead monitors the overall health of the safety team and performs the task of obtaining 
resources to support the team as well as acting as an interface with management to work 
out the problems encountered.  The facilitator works with the team day-to-day on hazard 
analysis to solve the technical issues, work out consistency, and integrate the findings of 
the other team members.  The whole team must be looking for the cross element 
integrated hazards, but this role of facilitator is particularly important in understanding 
past failures as well as having a certain “paranoia” towards complex system interactions.  
 
The graphical analyst role in the team is crucial.  There are many methods of performing 
graphical analysis, fault trees, fish bone diagrams, and event trees. It is important to have 
someone willing and capable of performing this sometimes tedious work. The person 
must be consistent and able to see across element lines.  For Ares, there is one person 
who keeps the fault tree and works with all safety analysts so that the fault tree supports 
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the analysis activity.  The fault tree provides consistency in documentation, an 
understanding of the hazard, and is an aid in explaining the hazard to those who must 
review the analysis. The fault tree is also useful in finding connections and similarities 
across the hazard reports. 
 
The design interface/analysts works with the project on trade studies, supports meetings, 
provides input to design, and performs the safety analysis with supporting fault trees. 
This part of the team has the most members and those fulfilling the facilitator role have 
also performed this task as well.  The analysts work with the element safety engineers as 
well as the design engineers.  Since hazard reports cut across element lines, they interface 
with all the elements.  In order to keep the team from being inundated with the element 
safety reviews, one analyst will be assigned to an element to attend the review, to provide 
feedback to the team, and inform integrated hazard report owners when a subject of 
interest is coming up in the review.  In addition to the element reviews, there are other 
reviews such as Ground Operation Systems and Orion reviews that are covered in similar 
fashion. 
 
The report champion ensures the safety effort is properly documented and provides the 
risk insight to those who make the decisions.  Every safety team has an oversight 
organization which reviews risk and is one of the customers for the documentation.  For 
the Ares Vehicle, it is the CSERP and the project manager. The CSERP requires an 
integrated data package to be delivered with fault trees, design discussions, safety 
analysis, and hazard reports.  A report and a presentation have to be created for the 
CSERP.  
 
The Engineering interface is a person provided by engineering to work with the team and 
provides the link to the engineering personnel needed to perform the work. This person 
provides engineering information and perspective to the safety team as well as the safety 
products to engineering. They also present briefings at Technical Interchange Meetings 
and reviews.  
 
Analysis Approach 
 
Dividing up the hazard analysis and subsequent hazard reports consists of choosing 
between a discipline (electrical, mechanical, etc.) approach, an element (Upper Stage, 
Upper Stage Engine, First Stage) approach, or a hazard category approach.  Division by 
discipline and element is a common engineering issue found in all organizations, which 
typically leads to the matrix approach where either the discipline manager or the element 
(or product) manager has control of the budget.  In this case, we were free to choose 
which approach was the best with out the budget issue bydividing the team by hazard 
using a hazard checklist, explosion, loss of control, loss of structural integrity, loss of 
function, etc. (Fig 2). 
 
The Ares Integration Safety team breaks up the hazard reports by hazard category.  The 
reason for breaking up the hazard reports by hazard category is because the element 
hazard reports, which the team is integrating, are based more on hazard category than 
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discipline. The Ares team itself could have been divided several ways: by discipline, by 
element, by hazards, or by some combination, each having its own advantage. Each of the 
elements of the Ares vehicle has a team with safety engineers broken up in different 
manners.  Part of this element team breakup that affected the team interface and analysis 
was that fact that contractors are designing the First Stage and Upper Stage Engine. The 
Upper Stage is being designed in-house.  The integration of the Ares Vehicle is also 
being done in-house. Interface with the Upper Stage safety team has the advantage of the 
team being easily accessible, as well as reduced contractual interfaces in data exchange  
Dividing the integration team by element has been easy in terms of interface, but major 
element issues that need to be identified could be missed. Dividing the team strictly by 
discipline could have lead to difficulties in integration of the findings into hazard 
categories. The past two manned space flight failures were cross disciple hazards which 
fit into hazard categories.  Challenger was fire/explosion of one element caused by 
leakage of a separate element.  Columbia was a structural failure caused by debris from a 
different element.  Lack of full coverage of each discipline also made the disciple 
approach less viable. The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, which is being done by the 
reliability group, tends to be element oriented.  Therefore, breaking up the hazard 
analysis by hazard category is a view which would have been lost if the element division 
approach would have been used.  Another driving factor came from the way the hazard 
reports were broken up. Having multiple members responsible for any one hazard report 
would have led to the need to perform an additional integration activity. 
 
 Training is essential since several of the engineers have not worked NASA safety 
programs before. The team meets most mornings to work through issues and specific 
hazard reports as they are created or updated  This provides the opportunity for questions 
to be raised and general information or instruction to be passed on to the team.  
 
Conclusions 
 
When assembling a safety team there are times when the choice of team members is 
limited.  Therefore, creativity is needed to work within the constraints. Selecting people 
that are motivated and eager to learn, combined with an open team atmosphere that 
allows training, is one answer to the problem.  Choosing how the work is divided, both 
functionally as well as how the hazards are broken up, can limit confusion and reduce the 
number of interfaces to a workable level.  In any case, integrated hazard analysis is an 
essential part of any complex system.  
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Figure 1 – Integrated Analysis Interfaces 
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Figure 2 – Dividing Hazard Analysis 
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